

ear after year, stall/spin events account for a disturbing number of general aviation accidents. According to the Air Safety Institute's Nall Report, "failure to maintain airspeed" appears as a proximate or contributing cause in roughly 40 percent of the fatal accidents. This statistic persists in spite of stalls, stall recovery, and stall prevention having been taught ad nauseam — to virtually every candidate for every certificate, rating, flight review, insurance checkout, and type certificate over the last half-century, or more.

Someone once defined insanity as "doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result." It is the opinion of this author — a long-time flight instructor — that the results demonstrate that we in the flight instruction profession are not giving our customers an adequate methodology for dealing with this problem. Specifically, we do not provide a sufficiently clear and effective means of preventing unintentional stalls. This article is an attempt to define such a methodology.

Central to the problem of the prevention of unintentional stalls is a general misunderstanding of how and why an aircraft will stall. Too often, we hear discussed the aircraft's stall speed; in fact, the aircraft stalls if, and only if, the wing exceeds the critical

angle of attack. That this will occur at a particular speed is only true given a closely-defined set of conditions. Any stall speed is only valid at a particular combination of weight and load factor; the critical angle of attack does not change as long as the flap configuration is constant.

A second concept that is poorly understood is the issue of trim and stability. Pilots tend to think that the aircraft trims to an airspeed; this, also, is only true under particular circumstances. The static

stability of an airplane tends to drive it back to a trimmed angle of attack. This will correspond to a particular airspeed only under steady-state conditions.

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The stability of the aircraft can be used to the pilot's advantage with regard to stall prevention. In a nutshell, let go of the controls. Once the controls are released, the aircraft will return to the trimmed angle of attack (regardless of the airspeed) within a little more than a second. Most aircraft will not trim to an angle of attack that exceeds the critical angle of attack; thus, with very rare exception, an aircraft loaded forward of the aft center of gravity limit cannot be stalled in hands-off flight.

Unintentional stalls, then, occur when the pilot applies enough backpressure on the yoke to overcome the natural stability of the aircraft, leave the trimmed angle of attack, and exceed the critical angle of attack. It would seem, then, that we could eliminate unintentional stalls by warning pilots to

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avoid applying excessive backpressure. One would think this would work. History tells us, however, that it does not. Discovering the reason for this paradox requires bringing some outside knowledge into

play. In particular, I find it helpful to consider the 19th century contributions of German anatomist and physiologist Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795-1878), and his student, physicist and philosopher Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887).

These two scientists developed the theory of perception, defining the "just noticeable difference (JND)," or, in other words, the minimum change in a stimulus required to trigger perception. With regard to pressure stimulus (such as force on the yoke), the JND is a change of approximately 14 percent of the pressure already present. Today, the relationships they defined are referred to as the Weber-Fechner law, or the W-F law. It is common knowledge in physiology but, unfortunately, not so well known in aviation.

There are several features of the W-F law which are important to flight operations. First, any stimulus (yoke pressure) which is constant will, over a short time, fade from perception. A pilot who is flying in an out-of-trim condition will soon lose the ability to

perceive that he or she is applying any elevator pressure at all. The out-of-trim condition becomes the new zero; the pilot cannot trim it off, because they do not perceive that it is there.

Second, a constant stimulus (i.e., steady backpressure to compensate for being out-of-trim) will elevate the just-noticeable-difference. If the pilot is holding a constant 20 lbs. backpressure, the minimum pressure change he or she can feel on the yoke is now 2.8 lbs., in any direction. Every attempt to make a "small" input will become a "small" input plus 2.8 lbs. of additional pressure that the pilot has no way to know he or she is applying. The result is over-controlling; small, precise inputs are impossible. Also, the pilot will tend to make unintended inputs, in pitch and roll, across a 5.6 lb. "dead spot" in his or her perception. This can be especially vexing when the pilot is attempting to accomplish non-flying tasks, such as reading a chart, or dialing a radio frequency; he or she will apply an unknown and unintended input up to the limits of the JND.

A pilot flying in this manner is much more at risk of inducing an unintentional stall. Too many pilots are in the habit of flying the aircraft with large control pressures, far away from the trimmed angle-of-attack. The elevated JND makes it easy to accidentally apply the control forces necessary to overcome the stability of the aircraft and drive it to and past the critical angle of attack.

What can we do?

To avoid the unintentional stall, we need to develop the habit of flying the aircraft in trim and hands off. An airplane which is in trim and flown hands off is (with rare exception) impossible to stall. The natural (static) stability will drive it to and hold it at the trimmed (not stalling) angle of attack; flying hands-off ensures the pilot will not force the aircraft away from the trimmed (not stalling) condition.

Getting into a perfectly-trimmed condition is not always as easy as it sounds. For most pilots, it requires a change in the way we touch the controls. Due to the physiology, it is virtually impossible for pilots to trim an aircraft precisely if their hands are still on the yoke. Trimming, then, requires that we trim the aircraft to the limits of our perception (trim off the pressure), and then let go. Only with the hands off the yoke can we observe the change in pitch attitude and vertical speed which is the clue to the remaining out-of-trim condition which existed below our ability to perceive. Once observed, the change should prompt the pilot to pitch (with the

yoke, not the trim) back to the desired pitch attitude and rate of climb, trim slightly against the error, and try again. Only when the aircraft will stay at the desired pitch attitude and vertical speed for five to 10 seconds in hands-off flight can it be considered to be truly in trim.

Once in trim, the pilot should endeavor to avoid violating that trim. That is, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Said another way, the pilot should not touch the yoke unless there is presently an error in pitch that needs correction. If the airplane is doing what it should, there is no need to touch it!

All transitions in airspeed, power setting, and configuration will induce some trim change. Any change in the trimmed condition should be immediately addressed, so as to bring the aircraft back to the desired trim. Once the trim is regained, the trim should be maintained by flying hands off to the maximum possible extent.

It is important to realize that the oft-repeated advice "use a light grip" is, unfortunately, a misnomer. Another principle of physiology, the graband-grip reflex, makes this so. Under stress, the reflex induces us to unconsciously grab hold (of the

yoke) and grip with increasing pressure. Over time, the light grip will invariably escalate to the famed white knuckles condition we see so often, and create all of the same problems as an out-of-trim condition. Thus, when a pilot does have to make a control input, it is important to avoid setting up a grip condition; it is better to touch the yoke, rather than to grip it. Use the minimum pressure required to achieve the desired correction, and then go back to hands off.

If you've developed the uneasy feeling that this methodology involves a radical change in the way we fly, you would be correct. It requires discipline, thought, and practice to achieve truly in-trim and hands-off flying skills but the rewards are worth it: better stall resistance, smoother ride for the passengers, more precise control of the aircraft, and lower pilot workload.

Try it.

Gene Hudson is an Assistant Chief Flight Instructor at Trade Winds Aviation at Reid-Hillview Airport, San Jose, Calif. He has been a flight instructor since 1987 and has logged over 17,000 hours in over 100 aircraft types.

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